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Abstract. How someone can get health insurance without sharing his health in-
formation? How you can get a loan without disclosing your credit score? There 
is a method to certify certain attributes of various data, either this is health metrics 
or finance information, without revealing the data itself or any other kind of per-
sonal data. This method is known as “zero-knowledge proofs”. Zero-Knowledge 
techniques are mathematical methods used to verify things without sharing or 
revealing underlying data. Zero-Knowledge protocols have vast applications 
from simple identity schemes and blockchains to defense research programs and 
nuclear arms control. In this article we present the basic principles behind ZKP 
technology, possible applications and the threats and vulnerabilities that it is sub-
ject to and we review proposed security solutions. 
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1 Introduction 
Zero-Knowledge proofs (also commonly referred to as ZKPs) are used as security pro-
tocols through which a digital authentication process can be facilitated without the use 
of any passwords or other sensitive data. As a result of this, no information, either from 
the sender’s or receiver’s end can be compromised in any way. The idea underlying 
zero-knowledge proofs first came to the fore back in 1985, when developers Shafi 
Goldwasser, Charles Rackoff and Silvio Micali [1] presented to the world the notion of 
“knowledge complexity” — a concept that served as a precursor to ZKPs. Simply put, 
ZKP is a probabilistic based verification method, which means it provides “fact-like 
statements” and “statements about personal knowledge” that can accumulate to show 
that the validity of an assertion is overwhelmingly probable. In other words, they don’t 
prove something that simply revealing it would be sufficient, but rather verify the 
knowledge of it. Moreover, the assertion cannot be verified by a third party. 
This is especially handy in various situations, e.g. when we want to spend money 
without revealing how much we used or in which currency it was spent. Besides money, 
private information such as date of birth, bank statements, transaction histories, 
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education credentials are vitally important. Companies like Facebook and Google lev-
erage from this data by using it to optimize their services to better appeal to you, and to 
re-sell it to other companies. It is prevalent now than ever before the need to maintain 
privacy in a data-based world. 
The paper is organized as follows. We provide an overview of the methodical ap-
proach used, important literature review and relevant references for this paper in Sec-
tion 2. In Section 3 we will dive deeper to the nuts and bolts of ZKPs and we will 
mention important theorems that drove its evolution. In Section 4 we present notable 
and the most recent use cases of zero-knowledge protocols. In Section 5 and subse-
quently in Section 6 we are discussing known threats and solutions of ZKP technolo-
gies. Finally, we discuss the current state of Zero-knowledge protocols in Section 7 and 
conclude in Section 8. 
2 Methodology 
Firstly, we approached from a theoretical point of view the rudiments of the ZKPs field. 
This served not only as a concise presentation of the principles underlining ZKPs but 
also gave us a historical aspect on how these protocols evolved. In this first step we 
consulted Rubinstein-Salzedo’s “Cryptography” as a primer. This book is less sophis-
ticated from others but manages to cover substantial topics in cryptography in an infor-
mal view. Silverman’s “An Introduction to Mathematical Cryptography” offered a 
mathematical approach for ZKPs and notions surrounding their functionality such as 
Complexity Theory and Random Oracle Models. A detailed and descriptive approach 
would require a strong background both in cryptology and in abstract algebra. 
Secondly, we searched mostly online articles and blogs on the current trends and 
technologies on ZKPs protocols since internet is the first place that breakthrough meth-
ods make headlines. We made sure to accompany all the new implementations appear-
ing in this paper with the relevant citations. A contemporary approach is not only man-
dated because the field of ZK applications is still in early stage but also it serves as a 
guide for the aspiring cryptographer or mathematician. 
3 The Principles of Zero-Knowledge Proofs 
We will start this Chapter by presenting two simple examples that demonstrate the con-
cept of zero-knowledge proof. 
3.1 Ali Babaa’s Cave (Example #1). 
The first and most important example is inspired by a paper titled “How to Explain 
Zero-Knowledge Protocols to Your Children” [2]. 
Consider, for the sake of example, a cave consisting of a circular tunnel. Diametri-
cally opposite to the entrance of this cave, there is a door which can only be opened by 
a password. Although this situation is probably not a real life scenario, it is quite useful 
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in the display of the basic properties of ZKP. Now Peggy (also known as the prover of 
the statement) knows the password to this door, and she wants to prove this to Victor 
(also known as the verifier of the statement) without actually disclosing it to him. They 
set off to complete the task as follows: 
Peggy goes into a random branch of the cave (that is, left or right). She does this 
without Victor knowing which branch she chose. Standing at the entrance of the cave, 
Victor calls out a random branch (again, either left or right), where he wants Peggy to 
come out from. Providing she really does know the password, she can obey Victor every 
time, using the door if necessary. 
However, if Peggy did not know the password, then she would only be able to return 
by the named path if Victor were to give the name of the same path by which she had 
entered. Since Victor would choose left or right at random, she would have a 50% 
chance fooling Victor. If both (prover and verifier) were to repeat the above process 
several times, say 20 times, Peggy’s chance of successfully anticipating all of Victor's 
requests would become vanishingly small. 
Thus, if Peggy repeatedly appears at the exit Victor names, he can conclude that it 
is extremely probable that Peggy does, in fact, know the secret word. 
3.2 Two Balls and the Color-Blind Friend (Example #2).  
Another classic example used to demonstrate ZKP is the following [3]. 
Imagine your friend is color-blind and you have two balls: one red and one green, 
but otherwise identical in their shape and size. To your friend they seem completely 
identical and he is skeptical that they are actually distinguishable. You want to prove 
to him they are in fact differently colored, but nothing else, thus you do not reveal which 
one is the red and which is the green. 
You give the two balls to your friend and he puts them behind his back. Next, he 
takes one of the balls and brings it out from behind his back and displays it. This ball 
is then placed behind his back again and then he chooses to reveal just one of the two 
balls, switching to the other ball with probability 50%. He will ask you, “Did I switch 
the ball?” This whole procedure is then repeated as often as necessary. He knows if he 
switched the ball because he did it himself, and you know if he did (because you can 
see the color) without revealing to him the actual color of the ball. 
The above examples demonstrate an important subtle feature, that of zero-
knowledge. Victor cannot convince anybody else of Peggy’s knowledge about the pass-
word. If Victor were to create a transcript (e.g. videotape the whole process) that could 
potentially be that of the communication between him and Peggy, it would be useless. 
This transcript would be indistinguishable from a transcript that is entirely fabricated 
by a cheating verifier. An outsider, watching the recording, could argue that Peggy and 
Victor agreed in advance about the sequence of chosen branches.  Thus, such a record-
ing will certainly never be convincing to anyone but the original participants. 
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3.3 Characteristics of ZKPs 
Interactive ZKPs: The examples above are forms of interactive proofs since the 
prover, performed a series of actions to convince the verifier, of a certain fact. The 
problem with interactive proofs is their limited transferability: to prove an ability at-
tribute, or possession of secret data to someone else, or to the verifier several times, the 
prover will have to repeat the entire process. 
Interactive ZKPs have further properties, namely Completeness and Soundness. 
Completeness Property: An interactive proof protocol is complete if, given an honest 
prover and an honest verifier, the protocol succeeds with overwhelming probability 
(i.e., the verifier accepts the prover’s claim). 
Soundness Property1: If the prover is lying, then he cannot convince the verifier that he 
is telling the truth, except with some very small probability. 
Zero Knowledge Property: Let’s consider the cave example once again and the vide-
otape (transcript) Victor made. We mentioned that if the recording were to be seen by 
a third party, it would not convince this party for Peggy’s knowledge. Thus, if Victor 
wants to convince a third party, he can ask Peggy to demonstrate the transcript once 
again, but this time it will be the third party who will pick his own sequence of chal-
lenges for Peggy (not Victor’s challenges). If there is a way to forge a proof that is 
indistinguishable from a genuine one (as in the case of the videotape), we say that there 
is a simulator for the proof in question. A proof of knowledge has the zero knowledge 
property if there exists a simulator for the proof. 
Non-interactive2 ZKPs (NIZK): In a non-interactive proof, the prover can deliver a 
proof that anyone can verify for themselves. This relies on the verifier picking a random 
challenge for the prover to solve. 
Cryptographers Fiat and Shamir [4-5] found that an interactive protocol can be con-
verted into a non-interactive3 one using a hash function to pick the challenge (without 
any interaction with the verifier). Repeated interaction between the prover and verifier 
becomes unnecessary, since the proof exists in a single message sent from prover to 
verifier. 
                                                          
1  Soundness can be described mathematically as an expected polynomial time algorithm M with 
the following property: if a dishonest prover can with non-negligible probability execute the 
protocol with the verifier, then M can be used to extract from this prover the knowledge which 
with overwhelming probability allows subsequent protocol executions. 
2  A Non-interactive, zero-knowledge proof example can be found here 
https://blog.goodaudience.com/understanding-zero-knowledge-
proofs-through-simple-examples-df673f796d99 
3  Only languages in BPP have NIZK proof systems, under suitable hardness assumptions, 
NIZKs exist for all languages in NP. 
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4 Applications 
4.1 Blockchain Use Cases 
So far ZKPs may seem like a conundrum and you might wonder if there are real world 
consequences. In this chapter we will present some important applications. 
Probably, the most prominent use case of Zero-knowledge proofs is within the con-
text of a blockchain ecosystem. It offers a lot of benefits in regard to validating crypto-
currency transactions without disclosing any data related to it - such as where the trans-
actions originated from, where it went or how much money was transferred. 
A real-world use case of this technology is Zcash, a crypto platform that employs a 
special iteration of zero-knowledge proofs - called zk-SNARKs - that allow native 
transactions to remain fully encrypted on the blockchain while still being verified under 
the network's consensus rules. 
The possibilities of zk-SNARKs are impressive, you can verify the correctness of 
computations without having to execute them and you will not even learn what was 
executed - just that it was done correctly. zk-SNARK stands for Zero-Knowledge Suc-
cinct Non-interactive ARguments of Knowledge [6], “Zero-knowledge” because they 
don’t reveal any knowledge to the verifier apart from ensuring that the transaction is 
valid, “Succinct” because the size of the proof is small enough to be verified in a few 
milliseconds, “Non-interactive” because the proof consists of a single message sent 
from prover to verifier and “Arguments” because the Soundness Property holds true. 
The usual cryptocurrencies, like Bitcoin, validate their transactions by linking the 
sender and receiver addresses, and input and output values on the public blockchain. 
Instead of exposing the above components, Zcash make use of zk-SNARKs to “obfus-
cate” them - it diminishes any meaningful connection between sender, receiver and 
amount. 
In a nutshell, if a sender wants to create a shielded transaction, he constructs a proof 
to show that with high probability, the input values sum to the output values for each 
shielded transfer, the sender proves that they have the private spending keys of the input 
notes, giving them the authority to spend and the private spending keys of the input 
notes are cryptographically linked to a signature over the whole transaction, in such a 
way that the transaction cannot be modified by a party who did not know these private 
keys. 
Users of cryptocurrencies often couple them with network-layer privacy enhance-
ments like Tor to level up their anonymity (we should better say pseudonymity in this 
case) with unpleasant results despite their efforts [7], unlikely Zcash does not suffer 
from the same threats. 
Zcash protocol has been found to be vulnerable to a number of attacks [21]: 
• ITM Attack, that is a linkability attack against shielded transactions 
• Danaan-Gift Attack, where the attacker transfers a very small but care-
fully chosen amount of Zatoshis in order to identify the spending of a pub-
lic address 
• Dust Attack, that is used to describe any very small amount that does not 
meaningfully cost much to the attacker 
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4.2 From zk-SNARKs to zk-STARKs 
As this wasn’t enough there is a more developed version of zk-SNARKs, it is called 
zk-STARKs - Zero-Knowledge Scalable Transparent Argument of Knowledge and it 
was introduced in 2018 (very recently) by Eli Ben [8]. 
Prior to the creation of zk-STARKs, zk-SNARKs required a trusted party to initially 
setup the ZK proof system which introduced the vulnerability of those trusted parties 
compromising the privacy of the entire system (read more about vulnerabilities in Sec-
tion 5). zk-STARKs improve upon this technology by removing the need for a trusted 
setup. In other terms, zk-STARK proofs present a simpler structure in terms of crypto-
graphic assumptions. 
The great advantage of zk-STARK is its scalability, meaning it can move computa-
tions and storage off-chain. Off-chain services will be able to generate STARK proofs 
that attest the integrity of off-chain computations and then can be integrated back on 
chain for any interested party to validate the computation. Also, while zk-SNARK com-
munication complexity - that is the amount of communication needed to solve a prob-
lem distributed among two or more parties - increases in a linear fashion, on the other 
side zk-STARK develops in the opposite way, and increase only slightly as the compu-
tation size grows. The same applies to the verifier complexity. zk-STARKs are about 
10 times faster than zk-SNARKs as computation size increases. 
4.3 Quantum Resistant 
Quantum computing has become a topic of interest and despite the fact they are char-
acterized with many novel attributes, unfortunately the truth is far from reality. Quan-
tum computers can achieve only special kinds of calculations and some of them could 
exploit today’s cryptographic techniques. Encryption schemes based on RSA and El-
liptic Curve Cryptography could prove obsolete in the near future. Notice that these 
algorithms rely on private and public key pairings, something that doesn’t apply in the 
case not only of zk-STARKS but also other ZKP methods in general. 
4.4 Zero-knowledge proofs in Banking 
In October 15 in 2018, ING published a report and subsequently an article [9], announc-
ing its own addition of ZKP to the blockchain technology. ING Bank is continuing 
further down the path of advanced blockchain privacy with the release of its Zero-
Knowledge Range Proofs (ZKRP) solution. 
The ZKRP scheme proposed can be used to prove a number is within a specific 
range. For example, a mortgage or loan applicant could prove that their salary or credit 
score sits within a certain range without revealing the exact figure. As such range proofs 
are computationally lighter than regular zero-knowledge proofs and run faster on a 
blockchain. 
Not long after this, ING took the solution a step further and introduced Zero-
Knowledge Set Membership (ZKSM), described in [10], going beyond numerical data 
to include other types of information, like locations and names. For instance, banks 
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could validate that a new client lives in a country that belongs to the European Union, 
without revealing the country. Simply put, this technology allows information to be 
shared without revealing contextual details. 
4.5 Nuclear Disarmament Applcations 
Zero-knowledge methods have been devised originally for computational tasks but re-
cently translated into use for a physical system. At the Department of Energy’s (DOE) 
Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory (PPPL) researchers have developed an experi-
mental verification protocol for weapon dismantlement agreements [11]. Their method 
includes a system that can compare physical objects while potentially protecting sensi-
tive information about the objects themselves. 
The process to prove two objects are identical - potentially nuclear warheads – is as 
follows: the prover provides two radiographic films already exposed with the inverse 
image of one test object and place them in two individual sealed boxes. The objects are 
placed in front of the boxes and getting radiated. This operation is essentially equivalent 
to adding a positive image on top of a negative image. The verifiers accepts the proof 
if both images after radiated are flat gray – meaning there is a 50 percent probability 
that the objects are indeed identical - otherwise he/she  rejects it. If multiple tests are 
run simultaneously and the inverse images are randomized to the transmission pattern 
of the test object, the probability that they are not identical falls even more. The proof 
is zero-knowledge because the verifier does not learn anything beyond the result of the 
proof. 
4.6 Other Use Cases of ZKPs 
• Ethereum: Ethereum is also working with zk-SNARK proofs since its Byzantium 
update in 2017 [12]. 
• PIVX: PIVX is a Proof of Stake (PoS) blockchain-based cryptocurrency created in 
2016. At its core, it relies on fungibility, transaction privacy, and community gov-
ernance. PIVX utilize zero knowledge proofs via ZeroCoin protocols [13]. 
4.7 Possible Use Cases of ZKPs 
There are many areas that can be enhanced by using Zero-Knowledge protocols where 
trust is required and there are large incentives to cheat, such as: 
Chain Voting Models: Voting can refer either to political elections or corporate voting, 
where shareholder participation is a longstanding economical pillar. In any voting pro-
cedure, security, anonymity and trust are of paramount importance since these parts are 
most likely to fail and participation might be lower in the possibility of censorship. 
These issues can be resolved with a zero-knowledge method. The whole procedure 
can move on a public blockchain. Every eligible voter (or shareholder) can cast their 
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ballot without revealing their identity and even more they can ask for verification of 
their vote to ensure their ballot was counted. 
Running a computation and verifying its results: In the last years there is a trend for 
research centers and enterprises to migrate their data to outside providers. This practice 
raise concerns about the integrity and confidentiality of computations conducted on this 
data. We can imagine for example, a research medical center who wishes to have access 
in a private data center that contains genetic information of individuals, in order to ap-
ply a new formula. 
This begs the following question, how we can verify the computations of the formula 
and at the same time achieve it without disclosing patients’ identity? A Zero-knowledge 
method could answer both of these contradictory objects. The data center can apply on 
behalf of the researchers the formula and prove them in zero-knowledge the result with-
out compromising the individuals' confidentiality [14]. 
Data Auditing: More and more users and enterprises resort in data centers due to stor-
age limitations or for specialized services. Data integrity and availability is of major 
concern for cloud storage services while users uploading their personal data together 
with authentication information. This means users have no longer possession of their 
data that may face risks like loss, corruption or the purchase from a third service or 
company. The same concerns apply also to distributed ledgers. 
Auditing from a third party is critical to prove data centers, financial institutions and 
exchanges are complying with regulations like GDPR [23]. Profiting from zero-
knowledge methods, we can construct protocol schemes to prevent the leakage of ver-
ified and private data, a problem that existing auditing protocols suffer from and can 
have devastating effects. The reader can find recent research in [15-16]. 
5 Threats and Vulnerabilities 
Zero-knowledge proofs are by definition methods which satisfy the appropriate security 
features that interest us. Attacks and vulnerabilities could be found in the designing of 
a ZKP protocol or in the system resources that support the realization of such features. 
The former one is most likely to happen since such designing requires a higher level of 
technical and theoretical sophistication that in the process a mathematical mistake 
might occur. Such mistakes could go completely unobservable like the “Infinite Coun-
terfeiting Vulnerability4”, a mathematical false in a research zk-SNARKs paper that 
could irreparably damage the market since other cryptocurrencies employ the same al-
gorithms. 
                                                          
4  The story behind it is very interesting and can be found here 
https://dci.mit.edu/research/2019/2/6/dci-director-was-
interviewed-for-fortunes-latest-article-zcash-discloses-
vulnerability-that-could-have-allowed-infinite-counterfeit-
cryptocurrency 
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5.1 Parameter Problem 
zk-SNARKs have undergone significant tinkering and exploration into their real-world 
application and efficiency improvements, yet is not a perfect cryptographic tool. 
For the zk-SNARKs to work, an initial setup phase is required where the so called 
“system parameters” are generated who act as a common reference string shared be-
tween prover and verifier and need to be built-in in advanced in every zk-SNARK im-
plementation. This process is known as a “trusted setup” which is a highly polarizing 
event. If the parameters get compromised, a malicious user could use it to generate fake 
proofs and theoretically create infinite amounts of counterfeit coins of the native token 
(not only for Zcash but for any other crypto currency that adopts the zk-SNARK tech-
nology) without anyone knowing. 
We can imagine a hypothetical scenario where elections take place on a blockchain 
using zk-SNARKs for proving votes. A powerful entity – such as a politician in the 
case of a Presidential vote – would have strong incentives to involve the parties with 
the setup of the zk-SNARK system to share the setup parameters. The entity could tilt 
the election in their intended direction by creating false proofs for votes taking place. 
The biggest problem with the zk-SNARK approach is that users need to implicitly 
trust in the setup phase and the parties involved to setup the system honestly. Users of 
the system will never actually know if the setup phase was compromised at the point of 
setup, or at some point in the future. In other words we could say that the system is as 
much secure as the incentives to circumvent the system are low. So, if this is the case, 
the door remains open for a system where users do not implicitly need to trust the parties 
involved in the system’s setup to be honest. 
5.2 Possible Attacks 
While cryptocurrencies increase their use as an actual currency and payment method so 
the interest for Simple Payment Verification (SPV) increases to support users who can-
not hold the full blockchain ledger in their mobile devices. As cryptocurrencies gear 
towards portability, software designers have not given much attention to system integ-
rity issues, thus system vulnerabilities are often unobservable. One of these dangers are 
fault attacks5, which potentially could extract data from the CPU or memory of a device 
at the time a ZKP protocol is taking place. 
In [17] the authors demonstrate the first (at the time) fault attack which is initiated 
purely form software – it removes entirely the physical access. A malicious user could 
unleash various vector attacks or a combination of them to induce faults in a CPU core 
while a ZK protocol is under verification. An attacker could fault the steps - and the 
respective data - which a verifier and a prover follow in a ZK protocol, and intercept 
(modify or destroy) the messages form one another. 
Researchers have identified a group of attacks based on the discovery of subliminal 
channels in cryptographic primitives that are used for hidden transactions. These 
                                                          
5  A fault attack is an attack on a physical electronic device which consists in stressing the device 
by an external mean in order to generates errors in such a way that these errors leads to a 
security failure of the system. 
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channels can allow malicious prover to embed tagging information about the user into 
each transaction, thus attacking the main purpose of the zk-SNARK information hiding 
[22] 
6 Solutions 
One way the Zcash team got around the parameter problem was to create a multi-party 
computation ceremony [18-19]. During the parameter creation a set of random numbers 
are produced, a process similar to the setup phase of a public-key cryptosystem. Zcash 
team refers to these random numbers as “toxic waste” to emphasize the need to get 
disposed with extreme caution. Multiple independent parties involved collaboratively 
in the construction of the parameters. It is apparent that it takes all the participants of 
the “ceremony” to be compromised or be dishonest in order to give away the parame-
ters. 
Another way to remedy the parameter problem is the choice users have to send to-
kens privately or publicly. Zcash concerning, the privacy features are not obligated, but 
are rather customizable. 
More powerful constructions of zk-SNARKS (and generaly non-interactive ZKPs) 
can rise to the challenge of the parameter setup. One of these, already mention above, 
is zk-STARKS. Another one is zk-ConSNARK which is developed by Suterusu6. 
Suterusu integrates a state of the art zero-knowledge schemes which are scalable and 
free of complex multi-party setup protocols. ConSNARKs can produce a sound block-
chain ecosystem, absence of manipulation for the users and massively improved effi-
ciency. 
7 Discussion 
We start our discussion by noticing first some technical details. The maximum rate, at 
which a blockchain protocol/technology is processed, is determined by the size of it, 
the size of the transaction and the intricacy of the underlying computations, conse-
quently this is determined by the ZKP protocol/technology the blockchain adopts. 
For example the complexity in terms of size of zk-STARKs rises much slower that 
the zk-SNARKs for one-time setup, after this phase SNARKs have much less size 
needed for computation in verifying the proof in faster times. On the other hand zk-
ConSNARKs allows for very small and constant size proof computations, which leads 
to much faster generation and verification times. We could argue that as zero-
knowledge technologies evolve, they push for smaller and smaller and/or constant size 
of proofs that can succeed better verification times [20]. 
In respect to privacy and confidentiality, most zero-knowledge technologies adopt 
zk-SNARKS implementations but all require a trusted setup event, meaning it is a one-
time event, if a vulnerability or mathematical mistake is to be found, a whole new multi-
party ceremony needs to be deployed which is an extremely complex procedure. There 
                                                          
6  https://www.suterusu.io/ 
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are few zero-knowledge breakthroughs that have got ridden the obligation of an initial 
setup. 
We can argue, in the context of a zero-knowledge protocol embedded in a system, 
that one rule is applied; the system is only as good as the secret it is trying to conceal. 
8 Does It Make The Cut? (Conclusions) 
So much of our world is dominated by services that gobble up our personal information, 
they abuse these data, they sell it to the highest bidder, they do not protect in on their 
own servers and they essentially leaving it out for ransom. It is vital now more than 
ever before the need for privacy. Zero-Knowledge innovations, like zk-SNARKs, are 
up to the task of preserving the confidentiality and the security of users’ data. They 
have the potential to enable trust levels that have never been achieved before. On the 
other side, since ZKPs have been theorized in 1985, it is the last six or so years we 
begun to use it in practice. We are still experimenting and try to understand how most 
effectively to apply it. It might take years until we manage to harness it true potential. 
We still have to overcome many challenges and to observe a broader range of appli-
cations, but there is no doubt we hold in our hands a novel class of technology, one that 
sparks further development and innovation. 
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